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Decolonizing Human Trafficking in Cambodia
by Corrin Chow
INTRODUCTION
The 2000 U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children (“Trafficking Protocol”) is a prosecu-
tion-driven solution to human trafficking.[1] However, 
under a decolonized analysis, the Protocol ignores 
victims’ and survivors’ agency, thus perpetuating 
ill-fitted solutions. This case study is about Cambodia. 
In 2008, Cambodia passed national counter-trafficking 
legislation entitled the Law of Suppression of Human 
Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation (LHTSE).[2] Al-
though these were celebratory moments, statistics on 
prosecuted cases and convictions are lacking. The U.S. 
Department of State, which monitors the Cambodian 
government’s remedial measures, ranked Cambodia’s 
weak efforts in the annual U.S. Trafficking in Persons 
Report (TIP Report).[3] The Cambodian Phnom Penh 
Post, an English-newspaper established since 1992, 
reported government spokesman Phay Siphan speak-
ing against Cambodia’s 2019 Tier 2 Watchlist status.[4] 
He said, “[w]e have failed to satisfy the U.S. but, in line 
with the code of ethics and culture of Cambodia, we 
are committed to combatting trafficking.”[5] There is 
a pertinent human trafficking crisis in Cambodia, but 
implementation is an issue. Since the current criminal 
justice approach is not procuring favorable results, 
scrutinizing the current model through a decolonized 
lens might suggest a more pertinent approach.
A decolonized perspective critiques the Eurocentric 
and Western bias in international human rights norms 
and regimes. Makua Mutua best explains this perspec-
tive using the savage-victim-savior (SVS) imagery.[6] 
The savage represents the State or cultural foundations 
that “choke or oust civil society” or cause the culture 
to deviate from human rights.[7] Individuals whose 
dignity and human rights are violated by savage state 
practices and cultures are perceived as victims. The 
victim is inherently innocence, helpless, and powerless 
in the face of the primitive savage. The savior acts as a 
shield against the savage’s tyranny and “protects, vindi-
cates, civilizes restrains, and safeguards.”[8]
Embodied in the SVS critique is an understanding that 
cultural differences and race relations influence and 
construe who is the savage, victim, or savior. As we as-
sess Cambodia’s counter-trafficking efforts, SVS high-
lights two flaws in Cambodia’s LHTSE and enforce-
ment mechanisms. Firstly, Cambodia’s internalization 
of the U.N. Protocol ignored the victim-stakeholder’s 
priorities, and, consequently, Cambodia’s relationship 
with Western influences color the problematic realities 
of implementing LHTSE.
The influence of SVS on Cambodia’s counter-human 
trafficking measures taken during Cambodia’s late 
20th-century sociopolitical history. Under the Marx-
ist Khmer Rouge leadership, Cambodia experienced 
gruesome civil war and the genocide of Cambodia’s 
intellectual class and political dissidents.[9] The Unit-
ed Nations sent the U.N. Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) to help re-establish Cambodia 
in 1992. UNTAC’s arrival coincided with an increase 
in local sex work and the explosion of mostly West-
ern NGOs.[10] Reportedly, when Cambodian Prime 
Minister Hun Sen was asked what the UNTAC’s legacy 
would be, he replied, “AIDS.”[11] The human rights 
savior created the savagery of sex trafficking within 
Cambodia that perpetuated Cambodia’s victimhood. 
Certain international NGOs framed the trafficking 
issue to significant donors by claiming the newly 
developing Cambodian government was too weak to 
address the problem.
This western influence and demand on Cambodia 
continue with the TIP Report. Countries on the Tier 
2 Watchlist have not complied with the minimum 
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standards listed in the U.S. Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protections Act of 2000 and have not 
demonstrated significant progress.[12] The TIP Report 
incentivizes the re-structuring of human rights violat-
ing states by threatening economic sanctions on totally 
non-compliant countries.[13]
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The U.N. Protocol’s definition of “trafficking in per-
sons” includes many crucial, but non-legal, terms, 
like: “exploitation” and “abuse of power” that have 
muddied an otherwise operational definition to detect 
victims and perpetrators. Cambodia, like many other 
countries, has adopted the Protocol’s definition word 
for word. In adopting and modeling LHTSE after the 
Protocol’s definitions and priorities, Cambodia misses 
the opportunity to prioritize the trafficking victim/
survivor’s priorities. LHTSE features only four arti-
cles concerning the victim’s welfare: right of nullified 
and voided exploitative contracts (Article 45), right 
to damages and restitution (Articles 46-7), right to 
concealed identity from being published or broadcast-
ed (Article 49). In Cambodia’s 2010 Criminal Code to 
LHTSE, Article 287 criminalizes any prevention of a 
public agency or “competent private organization” that 
assists victims or at-risk persons.[14]
Cambodia does have a minimum standards of pro-
tection policy, which presents itself as victims-first 
legislation.[15] The 2009 policy strives to fill in a hu-
man rights gap but within a prosecution framework. It 
includes progressive measures, such as Article 6(10), a 
victim’s right to a reasonable reflection period before 
making a decision.[16] This recovery time allows a 
victim to access services and begin recovery without 
undue pressure to cooperate with law enforcement or 
make an immediate decision.[17] Unfortunately, these 
minimum standards fall short of full judicial adher-
ence and implementation.[18]
ANALYSIS
A. Critiquing the Development and Application of 
Counter-Trafficking Law
Cambodia’s 2008 LHTSE amended the 1996 Law 
on Suppression of the Kidnapping, Trafficking, and 
Exploitation of Human Beings. Under pressure from 
multiple anti-trafficking NGOs and programs that 
were looking for significant donor funding, Cambodia 
“hastily enacted” its 1996 statute without much un-
derstanding of trafficking; for instance, the undefined 
“accomplice” could criminalize law enforcement, pro-
tecting the brothels.[19] The statute also criminalized 
commercial sex work only (disregarding forced labor) 
and indiscriminately labeled the “victim” as a person 
who voluntarily consented to engage in commercial 
sex work.
In the early 2000s, the Bush Administration—who 
considered all sex work as forced and exploitative—
supported Cambodia and other countries with $50 
million to pass new anti-trafficking bills.[20] Cambo-
dia, with the consultation of an international group, 
passed the 2008 LHTSE. However, the 2008 LHTSE 
did not address the 1996 LHTSE’s inconsistencies or 
leave the emphasis on sex trafficking; neither did it 
interpret what “exploitation” meant (Keo 2014).[21] 
According to the Cambodia Center for Human Rights 
(CCHR) 2010 report, the application of LHTSE has 
been “inconsistent at best and incorrect at worst.”[22] 
One of CCHR’s recommendations regarding victim 
protection was that the Cambodian government 
should ensure Cambodia’s judiciary recognizes that 
victim protection is crucial to prosecution, and should 
implement and adhere to a common minimum stan-
dard of care for victims of human trafficking.
B. Benefits of a Decolonized Approach
Cambodia’s economic and governance dependency 
makes it suspectable to the good intentions of foreign 
organizations and stakeholders.[23] Human trafficking 
is a horrific violation that should be eradicated. How-
ever, the SVS critique prompts an awareness that not 
all good intentions thoughtfully produce objectives or 
laws sensitive to power imbalances, colonial influenc-
es, and the complexities of contributory factors to hu-
man trafficking within the context of the individual’s 
daily world. Legal practitioners, advocates, and poli-
cymakers must be aware that the various stakeholders 
in the counter-trafficking sector may have conflicting 
interests and/or different priorities (Gallagher and 
Surtees 2011).[24] Cambodia’s anti-trafficking frame-
work cannot be separated from its history of the West’s 
influence. The international community’s desire to 
rescue and redeem Cambodia from its horrific Khmer 
Rouge is dangerously paternalistic. This paternalism 
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ethnic preferences, migrant workers, and misogyny of 
victimhood.[25] These biases may determine which 
victims get rescued by law enforcement and their cases 
prosecuted. Clear demarcations between who is/is not 
a victim do not provide justice for the diverse perspec-
tives and experiences of Southeast Asian sex workers. 
Justice calls for making the worker’s voice the domi-
nant and influential narrative.
A decolonized approach also recognizes the SVS cri-
tique in Cambodia’s legislation. Cambodia’s legislation 
was passed with the substantial help and influence of 
international voices. Cambodia inherited the ideals 
of the savior without coming into its own voice. The 
Western condemned Cambodia’s governance ideals 
as savage while simultaneously recasting Cambodia’s 
new democracy as an unblemished project, free and 
separated from the legacies of its colonial past. As a 
result, Cambodia’s legislative focus on sex trafficking 
perpetuates a feminization of victimhood, excluding 
the thousands of trafficked Cambodian men working 
in Thai fishing vessels.[26] A decolonized perspective 
encourages identifying which actors and systems sup-
port trafficking schemes. Let the survivors and advo-
cates lead the data collection by setting metrics based 
on their insight into the industry. Cambodia, not a 
Eurocentric entity, should identify which stakeholders’ 
voices could best navigate through and whose priori-
ties best address anti-trafficking.
CONCLUSION
Some may argue that a victim-centered approach is 
only as good as the enforcement. They may propose 
that, since corruption has made cooperation between 
the Cambodian police and judicial systems weak, 
perhaps Western intervention would be more helpful 
than leaving Cambodia’s government alone. A West-
ern powers-backed prosecutorial crackdown of senior 
Cambodian government officials may be best practice 
to change the culture of corruption from top-down. 
It may show that counter-trafficking efforts must be 
taken seriously. Nevertheless, prosecution should not 
be the only approach. Corruption is a symptom of 
a cultural norm. In order to tackle a pervasive prac-
tice, SVS critique forces human rights practitioners 
to consider the victims/survivors themselves. Relying 
on the survivors and advocates and listening to their 
priorities is how well-meaning interventions can avoid 
harmful implications.
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Punished for Being Abused: The Unfair 
Prosecution of Children Affiliated with ISIS
by Mary Kate O’Connell
Since regaining control of their state from ISIS in 2017, 
Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government Authorities 
(KRG) have arrested and detained approximately 1,500 
children for alleged ISIS affiliation.[1] Of the children 
detained, an estimated 185 have been convicted for 
terrorism and sentenced to prison in Iraq.[2] 
Many of these children were not voluntary affiliates 
of ISIS and should not be imprisoned for serving as 
child soldiers. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on 
Children Associated with Armed Forces of Armed 
Groups (“Paris Principles”) defines a child soldier as a 
person under 18 who has been recruited or used by an 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, includ-
ing, but not limited to, children used as fighters, cooks, 
porters, spies or for sexual purposes.[3] Since 2014, 
ISIS has kidnapped, bought, and enslaved children to 
assist with terrorist operations.[4] ISIS has recruited 
the children using aggressive propaganda that per-
suades parents that giving their children to ISIS leads 
to wealth, honor, and prosperity for the family.[5] In 
some ISIS controlled areas of Syria, high school and 
university students were required to pledge allegiance 
to ISIS to graduate.[6] Once successfully recruited by 
ISIS, many of these children are placed into religious 
camps where they are indoctrinated with ISIS’ beliefs 
and missions.[7] Recruited children over the age of 
ten are then placed into military training.[8] If any 
child tries to escape or dissent, they are often beaten 
or killed.[9] ISIS has the most widespread use of child 
soldiers in modern history and continues to use child 
soldiers to this day.[10]
KRG’s criminalization of children for their involuntary 
service to ISIS as child soldiers violates international 
law.[11] Under the Paris Principles and Guidelines on 
Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed 
Groups (“Paris Principles”), children who escape or 
are released from involvement with armed forces 
retain their human rights as children and international 
law must be applied to any proceedings involving the 
children.[12] More specifically, under international 
law, the children may not be subjected to torture or 
cruel punishment, may not be sentenced to death nor 
life imprisonment without possibility of release, and 
may not be deprived of their liberty.[13] The Paris 
Principles also require that all appropriate action is 
taken to ensure family re-unification and the re-in-
tegration of the child into society.[14] The release 
process of a child from an armed group is crucial to 
the child’s re-integration, and the child should not be 
detained or prohibited from receiving rehabilitative 
services.[15] The KRG is violating the Paris Principles 
by immediately detaining children released from ISIS 
control and using torture methods to elicit confessions 
of ISIS affiliations from children. The KRG has also 
not taken any necessary steps to assist in the rehabili-
tation or re-integration of child soldiers released from 
ISIS.[16] 
Punishing child soldiers also violates the 2000 Op-
tional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict.[17] While the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child outlines each child’s juvenile justice rights, 
the 2000 Optional Protocol specifically addresses the 
issue of children involved in armed conflict.[18] Reaf-
firming the importance of protecting children’s rights, 
the Protocol describes the harmful impact of armed 
conflict on children and prohibits the recruitment 
or participation of any person under the age of 18 in 
armed conflict.[19] Article 7 of the Optional Protocol 
specifically requires member states to assist in the re-
habilitation and social reintegration of persons under 
18 who were recruited and involved in armed conflict.
[20] Iraq ratified the Optional Protocol in 2008 which 
means that the KRG’s current detention and sentenc-
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law.[21] 
As a signer of the Optional Protocol, Iraq should be 
held accountable for violating Article 7. While the 
KRG is a semi-autonomous region of Iraq, it is con-
sidered part of Iraq by the United Nations. Therefore, 
since the KRG has violated the 2000 Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Iraq 
is a signing member of this treatise, the UN Security 
Council should make efforts to intervene in the KRG’s 
punishment and detainment of child soldiers of ISIS. 
Such efforts should include requiring the KRG to re-
lease child soldiers after questioning and to implement 
reunification plans between child soldiers and family 
members. Unfortunately, Iraq is not a state member of 
the International Criminal Court, which means that 
the ICC’s ability to intervene in the KRG’s punishment 
of child soldiers is limited.[22] 
Given the recent actions of KRG towards child soldiers 
released from ISIS control, the international commu-
nity can and should intervene under the 2000 Option-
al Protocol to prevent further punishment of child 
soldiers.[23] The UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child requires member states to take corrective action 
to protect the best interests of children and to allow all 
children to enjoy basic human rights.[24] KRG is vio-
lating the basic human rights of ISIS child soldiers by 
preventing them from family reunification and using 
torture methods to elicit confessions. International law 
requires the reintegration and rehabilitation of child 
soldiers, and KRG is violating international law by 
instead detaining, convicting, and imprisoning child 
soldiers for their involuntary affiliation with ISIS.
1 Jo Becker, “Everyone Must Confess” Abuses against Chil-
dren Suspected of ISIS Affiliation in Iraq, Human RightsWatch 
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Court of Justice of the European Union Rules 
Against Polish Law on the Supreme Court
by Ben Phillips
The Europe Union (EU) is embroiled in an internal 
struggle over the rule of law and preserving its dem-
ocratic rights and values against creeping authoritari-
anism. The Polish legislature passed a law that lowered 
the retirement age of Supreme Court judges to remove 
current judges and pack the courts with judges that are 
loyal to the Law and Justice Party. In Commission v. 
Poland, case C619/18 (6/24/19), Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) ruled that the Polish Law on 
the Supreme Court (“Law on the Supreme Court”) was 
contrary to EU law.[1] The CJEU addressed Poland’s 
practice of packing courts with loyal political appoin-
tees and demonstrated how this subverts judiciary 
independence.[2] This decision is a major develop-
ment in combating the trend of authoritarian regimes 
using legal methods to undermine democratic checks 
and balances.
The Law on the Supreme Court, passed on April 3, 
2018, forced Supreme Court judges to retire at the age 
of sixty-five, unless they are granted an extension by 
the President. The CJEU struck down this law on June 
24, 2019 for violating EU law on rule of law and inde-
pendent judiciaries.[3] The CJEU is the constitutional 
supranational court of the EU, and they are often 
trying to balance protecting the uniformity of EU law 
and respecting the autonomy of the European member 
states. Here, the Court held that the Polish law had no 
legitimate government interest and violated the provi-
sions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).[4] The 
CJEU specifically pointed to the principles of indepen-
dent judiciaries and the irremovability of judges. The 
EU is currently embroiled in what has been called the 
“rule of law crisis.”[5] Prior to this case being decided 
by the CJEU, the European Commission referred the 
matter of the breakdown in the rule of law in Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania to the Council of Europe.[6] The 
two major regimes that have brought about this crisis 
are the Law and Justice Party in Poland and Prime 
Minister Victor Orban’s Fidesz Party in Hungary. 
These two authoritarian regimes denounce the Euro-
pean judiciary for undue interference with national 
politics and espouse a form of unchecked nationalism.
[7] This CJEU case on Poland’s attempted court pack-
ing is part of a larger narrative stemming from the 
“rule of law crisis” and challenges to the principles of 
democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights 
law enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and in the United Nations Declara-
tion of Human Rights.[8]
At first glance, the issue of court packing may not 
stand out as a democratic or human rights issue. 
Many countries have packed courts without human 
rights implications. However, Hungary and Poland are 
packing their courts to undermine accountability and 
judicial independence.[9] The right to effective remedy 
and the right to a fair trial before independent national 
judiciaries are specifically protected by Articles eight 
and ten of the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights.[10] The right to effective remedy and fair trial 
are also protected under Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.[11] The 
right to a fair trial and judicial independence are criti-
cal to protecting individual rights, and these rights are 
also imperative for enforcing checks on other human 
rights abuses as well.
These authoritarian regimes use legal methods to 
undermine their own institutions and advance their 
illiberal law and policies. There are concerted efforts 
in both Hungary and Poland to dismantle democratic 
protections.[12] These regimes did not gain power 
all at once. Instead, their leaders and political groups 
have slowly and strategically subverted their coun-
try’s democratic institutions and processes in order to 
entrench themselves in power and destroy the checks 
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focused on compromising the impartiality of the 
judiciary, replacing judges and packing courts, and 
increasing political appointments of loyal judges.[14] 
The compromised impartiality of the Polish and Hun-
garian judiciaries have paved the way for attacks on 
reporters, detaining asylum seekers and immigrants in 
Hungary, and restricting the rights of Civil Society Or-
ganizations and Human Rights organizations to gather 
freely in Poland.[15] These largely unchecked actions 
are possible, in part, thanks to the Polish and Hungar-
ian regimes sabotage of their democratic institutions. 
These actions are the backdrop for the CJEU decision 
in Commission v. Poland.
The CJEU struck down the Law on the Supreme Court 
because it violated EU Law. Specifically, the CJEU 
cited to Article 19(1) of the TEU, “Member States shall 
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection” of EU law and Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
right to effective remedy and a fair trial.[16] The Court 
argued that Poland’s compulsory retirement of judges 
on the Supreme Court undermined the independence 
and effectiveness of the judiciary, in violation of the 
fact that domestic courts are also EU courts and must 
monitor the effective implementation of EU law.[17] 
The Court further argued that the law compromised 
the judges’ impartiality because the President had 
complete discretion to extend (or not extend) judicial 
terms past the retirement age.[18] The Court ruled 
that court packing and eroding judicial independence 
violated the principle of rule of law espoused in Article 
2 of the TEU, which lays out the fundamental princi-
ples of the EU and its member states.[19] This ruling 
shows that the CJEU and laws of the EU can still be 
relied on to deal with the rule of law crisis in Europe.
Since the CJEU’s judgement, the judges removed by 
the Law on the Supreme Court have been reinstated.
[20] If the CJEU can have such effect in Poland, it can 
also monitor other laws and policies that undermine 
judicial independence in Romania and other Euro-
pean countries edging towards illiberal policies and 
authoritarianism.[21] These governments intentionally 
compromise their own judiciaries to silence political 
opposition and circumvent the enforcement of other 
human rights obligations. However, the effective use 
of the CJEU and other EU institutions is an important 
strategy to curb the spread and empowerment of au-
thoritarian regimes. Most importantly, it demonstrates 
that these countries are still able to be held account-
able and cannot completely evade enforcement. Out-
side of actual changes caused by the CJEU decision, it 
also represents an ideological demonstration that the 
EU will take active measures to stand against policies 
and laws meant to undermine judicial independence 
and other democratic values. The intervention of the 
EU and the CJEU is a concrete step toward combatting 
undemocratic policies and laws that limit access to an 
independent judiciary and a fair trial.
The CJEU decision on Poland’s Law on the Supreme 
Court is an important moment in addressing the rule 
of law crisis in Europe. The EU must apply and repli-
cate these processes in the other member states in the 
EU that are employing similar practices to threaten the 
independence of their judiciaries. This is imperative 
to combat the erosion of judicial independence and 
maintain checks on authoritarian executive and legis-
lative powers. The right to a fair trial and independent 
judiciary are vital human rights because they protect 
the rule of law and ensure that other obligations are 
being enforced.
1 Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No. 
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A New Approach: Gang-based Asylum in 
the Age of “Zero Tolerance”
by Caylee Watson
A record number of migrants are fleeing the Northern 
Triangle. In recent years, about 265,000 migrants have 
left annually. This number is on track to more than 
double in 2019.[1] Gang violence, corruption, and a 
lack of economic opportunity and security challenge 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.[2] Homicide 
rates in the Northern Triangle have been among the 
world’s highest for decades.[3] It is no secret that the 
U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s through the 1990s 
laid the foundation for much of the instability in the 
region. Over the past twenty years, the U.S. has at-
tempted, with limited effect, to remedy the situation 
by aiding programs that try to combat the underlying 
issues causing some of the instability.
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald 
Trump promised to reduce “illegal immigration.”[4] 
When he became president, in addition to developing 
a scheme to build a wall on the Mexican northern-U.S. 
southern border, President Trump enacted “zero-tol-
erance” policies that led to family separation.[5] Since 
Trump took office three years ago, not only has the 
United States seen an influx in irregular entries at the 
southern border, but the zero-tolerance policies may 
even violate domestic and international law.[6]
For example, in the spring of 2018, the Trump Admin-
istration (“Administration”) implemented a zero-tol-
erance policy which sought to criminally prosecute all 
adults entering the United States irregularly, including 
asylum seekers, and those traveling with children.
[7] Simultaneously, the Administration cut hundreds 
of millions of dollars in aid to the Northern Triangle 
because the countries “failed to slow migration flows 
to the United States.”[8] These policies contradict each 
other — experts agree that cutting off assistance aimed 
to help programs improve safety and economic secu-
rity in the region was only going to cause migration 
to increase.[9] In fact, the policies have failed to slow 
the number of migrants and have led to overcrowded 
detention centers and a massive backlog in U.S. immi-
gration courts.
One aspect of immigration policy that the Admin-
istration cannot override through proclamation or 
executive order is asylum law. Under the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol, the U.S. cannot deny entry 
to asylum seekers.[10] Domestically, an asylum ap-
plicant meets the definition of a refugee under INA 
§ 101(a)(42) if the person seeking asylum is “unable 
or unwilling to return to . . . [his or her] country [of 
origin] because of persecution or a well- founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”[11]
However, in the past year, alongside the above-men-
tioned executive orders, the Attorney General (“AG”) 
has decided a number of cases that impede tradition-
al Asylum law.[12] In Matter of A-B- and Matter of 
L-E-A-, the AG attempted to limit the scope of the 
frequently utilized protected ground, “particular social 
group,” by asylum applicants fleeing gang violence in 
the Northern Triangle.[13] Prior to Matter of L-E-A- 
and Matter of A-B-, an applicant could demonstrate 
that they were persecuted as a member of a particular 
social group if they could show that they were perse-
cuted because of gender-based domestic violence or 
because of their familiar ties. Now, in circuit courts 
that lack overriding precedent, both Attorney General 
Sessions’ and Barr’s interpretations present problems 
for applicants. This article suggests a supplementary 
approach—(imputed) political opinion—for attorneys 
representing asylum applicants fleeing gang-based 
persecution.
For an applicant to establish their eligibility for asylum 
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allege specific facts from which it can be inferred that 
they hold a political opinion known to the persecutor, 
and that the persecution occurred on account of that 
political opinion.[14] The protected ground of (imput-
ed) political opinion is a valid strategy when advocat-
ing for victims claiming asylum for gang opposition. 
For example, although gangs are not “the state,” in the 
Northern Triangle, certain gangs operate as the “de 
facto” government and wield more power and control 
over the country and its citizens.[15] The UNHCR 
explained that “[t]he ground of political opinion 
needs to reflect the reality of the specific geographical, 
historical, political, legal, judicial, and sociocultural 
context of the country of origin.[16] In contexts, such 
as in El Salvador and Guatemala, objections to the ac-
tivities of gangs may be considered as opinions that are 
critical of the methods and policies of those in control 
and, thus, constitute a “political opinion” within the 
meaning of the refugee definition. For example, indi-
viduals who resist recruitment by gangs, or who refuse 
to comply with demands made by the gangs, such as 
demands to pay extortion money, may be perceived as 
holding a political opinion. In addition, the gangs in 
the Northern Triangle have demonstrated a capacity 
to challenge states directly by murdering state officials 
and controlling other corrupt law enforcement, polit-
ical, or local security officers. Therefore, those victims 
who resist such authorities are persecuted on
account of their political opinion because, in the 
Northern Triangle, the gangs have infiltrated the state 
and are in control of the political world.[17]
Although some immigration courts have failed to 
find asylum based on this approach, the adjudicators 
explained that they were not presented with enough 
evidence to show significant gang control of the state. 
For example, Matter of S-P- held that imputed political 
opinion may satisfy the refugee definition.[18] There-
fore, with some adjustments, advocates can use this 
case to make valid asylum claims.
Additionally, in Koudriachova v. Gonzales, the Second 
Circuit emphasized, for imputed political opinion, “the 
relevant question is not whether an applicant subjec-
tively holds a particular political view, but instead, 
whether the authorities in the applicant’s home coun-
try perceive him to hold a political opinion and would 
persecute him on that basis.”[19] When determining 
authorities, “adjudicators must consider the claim 
within the context of the country itself.” Also, in the 
Ninth Circuit, the Court in Regalado-Escobar v. Hold-
er, found that opposition to a strategy of violence can 
constitute a political opinion for asylum purposes.[20]
In their article ‘Third Generation’ Gangs, Warfare in 
Central America, and Refugee Law’s Political Opinion 
Ground, Deborah Anker and Palmer Lawrence argue 
that despite the positive foundation, Immigration 
Judges dealing with seriously overloaded dockets, lim-
ited authority to grant continuances, and completion 
quotas will be hard-pressed to engage in “complex and 
contextual factual inquiry.”[21] Practitioners should 
do their best to educate adjudicators through coun-
try-condition evidence, expert testimony, memoranda 
of law, and detailed direct examination of the asylum 
seeker.
For example, in Marroquin-Ochoma v Holder, the 
Eighth Circuit indicated that “. . . [e]vidence that the 
gang is politically minded could be considered ev-
idence that the gang members would be somewhat 
more likely to attribute political opinions to resisters,” 
but found that a “generalized political motive underly-
ing the gang’s forced recruitment” was inadequate evi-
dence to establish that resistance to the recruitment ef-
forts was based on an anti-gang political opinion.[22] 
More recently, this approach succeeded in the Fourth 
Circuit case, Alvarez Lagos, where the Court conclud-
ed that the country conditions and evidence presented 
by the applicant showed that Mara 18, a powerful gang 
in the Americas, imputed her anti-gang political opin-
ion and that opinion was one central reason for her 
persecution.[23] Expert testimony showed that Alva-
rez Lagos’s failure to comply with the gang’s demands 
and subsequent flight to the United States would be 
seen by Mara 18 as “a direct challenge to its efforts to 
establish and maintain political domination within 
Honduras.” As a direct result, she would be “targeted 
for violence in a manner that was very graphic, and 
visible to the community.” Another expert explained 
that failure to pay was not simply a refusal to pay a 
debt, but Mara 18 would feel “compelled to crush what 
it views as political resistance.”
Although the imputed political opinion route may be 
weaker than the well-established, but recently con-
tested, protected ground of “particular social group,” 
it does not diminish the fact that it is a perfectly valid 
way to argue a protected category. Under current case 
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Triangle, the Courts are making the correct decisions 
in recognizing (imputed) political opinion. The idea 
that opinions or matters that involve gangs might con-
stitute political opinion is supported by the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), which has recently published Eligibility 
Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection 
Needs of Asylum Seekers from Guatemala (January 
2018), El Salvador (March 2016), and Honduras (July 
2016).[24] Therefore, the U.S. has a duty under the 
obligations of the Refugee Convention and Optional 
Protocol to recognize this protected category.
Not only is (imputed) political opinion based on gang 
persecution a valid protected category, but it could 
lead a new age of asylum law practice during zero-tol-
erance.
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